We study the dynamics of a version of the batch minority game, with random external information and with different types of inhomogeneous decision noise ͑additive and multiplicative͒, using generating functional techniques à la De Dominicis. The control parameters in this model are the ratio ␣ϭp/N of the number p of possible values for the external information over the number N of trading agents, and the statistical properties of the agents' decision noise parameters. The presence of decision noise is found to have the general effect of damping macroscopic oscillations, which explains why in certain parameter regions it can effectively reduce the market volatility, as observed in earlier studies. In the limit N→ϱ we ͑i͒ solve the first few time steps of the dynamics ͑for any ␣), ͑ii͒ calculate the location ␣ c of the phase transition ͑signaling the onset of anomalous response͒, and ͑iii͒ solve the statics for ␣Ͼ␣ c . We find that ␣ c is not sensitive to additive decision noise, but we arrive at nontrivial phase diagrams in the case of multiplicative noise. Our theoretical results find excellent confirmation in numerical simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the more recent application domains of equilibrium and nonequilibrium statistical mechanics is the analysis of simplified models describing large markets of competing traders ͑or agents͒. One such model, which in spite of its apparent simplicity was found to exhibit highly nontrivial behavior and has, therefore, attracted much attention, is the so-called minority game ͑MG͒ ͓1,2͔, which is a variation on the so-called El-Farol bar problem ͓3͔, which mimics, in a highly idealized fashion, a market of speculators attempting to profit by buying when most others wish to sell or selling when others wish to buy, without individual knowledge of their fellows but only of their collective consequences and external information available to all. An extensive overview of the literature on the MG and its many variations and extensions can be found in ͓4͔. The striking feature of the MG, clearly observed in numerical simulations, is the nontrivial dependence of the market volatility ͑measuring global fluctuations͒ on the dimensionality of the information supplied to the agents ͑which is defined as the relative number ␣ of different values which the information can take͒. For large ␣ the volatility approaches the value corresponding to random trading, and the system is ergodic. As ␣ is reduced, the volatility is also found to decrease beneath random, which is indicative of a more efficient market, where agents have ''learned'' to improve the effectiveness of their selection of trading strategies. A further decrease of ␣ will at some critical point ␣ c force the system to undergo a phase transition to a highly nonergodic regime, where both a high-volatility state and a low-volatility state can emerge, dependent on initial conditions ͑this was only appreciated later͒.
In the original minority game, the information supplied to the agents consisted of the actual history of the market. However, it was soon realized ͓5͔ that the dynamics of the MG remains largely unaltered if, instead of the true history of the market, random information is supplied to the agents; given ␣, the only relevant condition is that all agents must be given the same information ͑whether sensible or otherwise͒. This led to a considerable simplification of theoretical approaches to the MG, since it reduced the process to a Markovian one. A further generalization of the game was the introduction of agents' decision noise ͓6͔, which was shown not only to improve worse than random behavior but also, more surprisingly, to be able to make it better than random for ␣Ͻ␣ c .
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The study ͓6͔ was followed by a number of papers aiming to develop a solvable statistical-mechanical theory, either by using decision noise to ''regularize'' the stochastic equations and replace these by deterministic ones ͑followed by an equilibrium analysis of the ergodic regime, built on the construction and exploitation of a Lyapunov function͒ ͓10,11͔, or by concentrating further on analysis of the stochastic equations themselves ͓12͔. Since the MG process does not obey detailed balance, such studies ͑which also involved different implementations of the decision noise͒, proved to be hard, and their results partly controversial ͓13,14͔ ͑especially with regard to the questions of whether and when the stochastic MG equations can be replaced by suitable deterministic ones͒.
More recently, in ͓15͔ the analysis of the MG was approached from a different angle: all problems and debates regarding microscopic determinism were simply avoided by re-defining the MG dynamics directly in the form of discretetime deterministic equations, without decision noise ͑the socalled ''batch minority game''͒. This allowed for an exact solution of the model using generating functional techniques à la De Dominicis ͓16͔, which was found to be in excellent agreement with numerical simulations, and which ͑due to it's dynamical nature͒ even applied to the nonergodic regime. The present study, which can be regarded as a natural followup on ͓15͔, achieves the following objectives. We gener-alize the ''thermal minority game'' such as to allow different agents to have different levels of decision noise. This introduces inhomogeneity into the agent population, as in, e.g., ͓9͔, which leads to interesting new phenomena and phase diagrams. We generalize and apply the ͑exact͒ formalism of ͓15͔ ͑which was developed for the deterministic MG͒ to the case of having inhomogeneous decision noise, within the context of the discrete-time deterministic ͑''batch''͒ equations. All our theoretical results are shown to find excellent confirmation in extensive numerical simulations.
II. MODEL DEFINITIONS
The minority game involves N agents, labeled with Latin indices i, j,k, etc. At each round l of the game, all agents act on the basis of the same piece of external information I(l). In the original model ͓1͔ the history of the actual market was used as the information given to the agents. In view of the observation in ͓5͔ that random information is equally efficacious, we consider here that at each round l the agents are given the information I(l)ϭI (l) , where for each l the label (l) is chosen randomly and independently from pϭ␣N possible values, i.e., (l)͕1, . . . ,␣N͖. To determine how to convert the external information into a trading decision, each agent i has at his or her disposal S strategies R ia ϭ(R ia 1 , . . . ,R ia ␣N )͕Ϫ1,1͖ ␣N ; a͕1, . . . ,S͖. Each component R ia is selected randomly and independently from ͕Ϫ1,1͖ before the start of the game, with uniform probabilities, and remains fixed throughout the game. The strategies introduce quenched disorder into the model. Each strategy R ia of every agent i is given an initial valuation or point score p ia (0). In the deterministic version of the game, given a choice (l) made for the information presented at round l, every agent i selects the strategy which for trader i has the highest valuation at that point in time, i.e., the strategy with label ã i (l)ϭarg max p ia (l), and subsequently makes a binary bid b i (l)ϭR iã i (l) (l) . The ͑rescaled͒ total bid at stage l is de-
. Each agent subsequently updates the payoff values of each of his or her strategies a on the basis of comparing the bid which would have resulted from playing that strategy with the actual outcome:
The minus sign in this expression ensures that strategies that would have produced a minority decision are rewarded.
Since the qualitative behavior of the market fluctuations was found to be very much the same for all nonextensive numbers of strategies per agent larger than one ͓1,2͔, we restrict our discussion to the Sϭ2 model, where the equations can be simplified upon introducing for each agent the instantaneous difference between the two strategy valuations, q i (l) ϭ͓ p i1 (l)Ϫp i2 (l)͔/2, as well as the average strategy i ϭ(R i1 ϩR i2 )/2 and the difference between the strategies i ϭ(R i1 ϪR i2 )/2. The actually selected strategy in round l can now be written explicitly as a function of a binary variable s i (l)ϭϮ1, which in the original model takes the value
, and the evolution of the difference will now be given by
with ⍀ϭN Ϫ1/2 ͚ j j R ␣N . In the so-called thermal minority game ͓6,12͔, the deterministic decision rule s j (l)ϭsgn͓q j (l)͔ is replaced by a stochastic recipe. Two different choices were proposed. In ͓6͔ the probability of the choice s i (l)ϭϮ1 was taken proportional to ͓1ϯe ␤q i (l) ͔ Ϫ1 , whereas in ͓12͔ also the alternative choice ͓1ϯe ␤ sgn[q i (l)] ͔ Ϫ1 was considered; as we shall show later, these are, respectively, examples of additive and multiplicative noise. In both cases the stochasticity is parametrized by a single control parameter ␤ϭT Ϫ1 , the ''inverse temperature.'' In both cases a nonzero T was shown in simulations to lead to a reduction in the volatility for ␣Ͻ␣ c , to a value lower than that for purely random decision choices. For ␣Ͼ␣ c the additive noise choice was shown to have no consequence for the long-time volatility behavior ͓12-14͔, reducing to the noiseless value, whereas multiplicative noise still had an effect ͑increasing the volatility͒ ͓12͔.
Here we generalize this idea further by allowing different traders to have different levels of stochasticity in their decision making ͑see also ͓9͔, where the MG with two such levels was studied͒. We will consider decision noise of the general form
in which the z j (l) are independent and zero-average random numbers, described by some symmetric distribution P(z) which is normalized according to ͐dz P(z)ϭ͐dzP(z)z 2 ϭ1. The function ͓q,z͉T͔͕Ϫ1,1͖ is chosen to interpolate smoothly via a single control parameter T between ͓q,z͉0͔ϭsgn͓q͔ for Tϭ0 and ͓q,z͉ϱ͔ϭϮ1 ͑randomly, with equal probabilities͒ for Tϭϱ, so that T provides a measure of the degree of stochasticity in the traders' decision making ͑with random choice in the case qϭ0). Typical examples are additive and multiplicative noise definitions such as ͓q,z͉T͔ϭsgn͓qϩTz͔, additive, ͑4͒ ͓q,z͉T͔ϭsgn͓q͔ sgn͓1ϩTz͔, multiplicative. ͑5͒
In the first case ͑4͒ the noise has the potential to be overruled by the so-called ''frozen'' agents ͓17͔, who have q i (t)ϳq i t for t→ϱ ͓13-15͔. In the second case the decision noise will even retain its effect for frozen agents ͑if they exist͒. The above definitions represent situations, where for T i Ͼ0, a trader i need not always use his or her ''best'' strategy; for T i →0 we revert back to the deterministic model. The impact of the multiplicative noise ͑5͒ can be characterized by the monotonic function
with (0)ϭ1 and (ϱ)ϭ0. For example, for a Gaussian P(z) one has (T)ϭerf͓1/ͱ2T͔. The two versions of the minority game studied in ͓6,12͔ correspond to the forms ͑4͒ and ͑5͒ with P(z)ϭ 1 2 K͓1Ϫtanh 2 (Kz)͔ and T i ϭT for all i. There has been much discussion on the derivation of the ''correct'' continuous microdynamics ͑see, e.g., ͓12-14,18͔͒. Here we circumvent that controversy and debate by directly employing a generating functional method ͓16͔ for the dynamics and by discussing the ''batch'' version of the problem ͓15͔ from the outset, rather than the original ''on-line'' version. In the batch version, rather than modifying the ͕q i ͖ after every observation of an individual piece of external information, they are modified according to the average effect of the possible choices for the external information:
where
The specific choice of time scaling in Eq. ͑8͒ has been made for later convenience. The batch dynamics ͑8͒ has the advantage of being sufficiently simple and transparent to allow for a straightforward exact dynamical solution of the model, using generating functional techniques ͓15͔. The process ͑8͒ is not exactly equivalent to Eq. ͑2͒, not even for N→ϱ ͑see ͓19͔ for the generating functional analysis of the on-line dynamics and its relation to the batch alternative͒, but it does present qualitatively similar features ͓12͔.
The magnitude of the market fluctuations, or volatility, is given by
where A ϭN
͔ and where ͗ . . . ͘ z denotes an average over the random numbers ͕z i ͖. One easily derives
Purely random trading corresponds to ͗p Ϫ1 ͚ A ͘ z ϭ0 and 2 ϭ1. Following ͓15͔ we also define the volatility matrix ⌶ tt Ј :
͑12͒
which measures the temporal correlations of the market fluctuations. Note that t 2 ϭ⌶ tt . In the case where the average bid ͗A͘ is zero ͑as in the present model͒, the volatility measures the efficiency of the market.
III. GENERATING FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
The canonical tool to deal with the dynamics of the present problem is generating functional analysis à la De Dominicis ͓16͔, which allows one to carry out the disorder average ͑here the average over all strategies͒ and take the N→ϱ limit exactly. The final result of the analysis is a set of closed equations, which can be interpreted as describing the dynamics of an effective ''single agent'' ͓16,21͔. Due to the disorder in the process, this single agent will acquire an effective ''memory,'' i.e., he or she will evolve according to a nontrivial non-Markovian stochastic process. Here we will follow closely the steps taken in ͓15͔, and we refer to the latter paper for full details of the calculation. In contrast to the situation in ͓15͔, for the present noisy version of the game one finds a microscopic transition probability density operator W(q͉qЈ):
͑13͒
with the short hand s j
The moment generating functional for a stochastic process of the present type is defined as
͑14͒
Derivation of the generating functional with respect to the conjugate variables generates all moments of q at arbitrary times. Upon introducing the two shorthands:
as well as Dqϭ͟ it ͓dq i (t)/ͱ2͔, Dwϭ͟ t ͓dw t /ͱ2͔, and Dxϭ͟ t ͓dx t /ͱ2͔ ͑with similar definitions for Dq, Dŵ , and Dx, respectively͒, the generating functional takes the following form:
where, as in ͓15͔, we introduced external ''forces'' i (t) to generate response functions.
To describe typical behavior, and in view of the selfaveraging character of the large N limit, at this stage we average over over the explicit choices of the quenched random parameters ͕R͖. These averages are not affected in any way by the introduction of the noise variables ͕z i ͖ or the independent temperatures T i , and the further procedure of ͓15͔ still applies here, generating the dynamical order param-
, and
and their conjugates. For times which are small compared with N and for simple initial conditions of the form p 0 (q)ϭ͟ i p 0 (q i ) one thus finds
The O(N 0 ) term in the exponent is independent of the fields ͕ i (t)͖ and ͕ i (t)͖. The three relevant exponents in Eq. ͑17͒
are given by the following expressions:
͑20͒
Here s i (t)ϭ͓q(t),z t ͉T i ͔ and the average ͗ ͘ z has now been reduced to a single site ͑but many time͒ one ͗g͓z 1 ,z 2 , . . . ͔͘ z ϭ͐͟ t ͓dz t P(z t )͔g͓z 1 ,z 2 , . . . ͔. Following ͓15͔ we have also introduced the short hands Dq ϭ͟ t ͓dq(t)/ͱ2͔, Dwϭ͟ t ͓dw t /ͱ2͔, and Dx ϭ͟ t ͓dx t /ͱ2͔ ͑with similar definitions for Dq , Dŵ , and Dx ). Note that all the quantities appearing in Eq. ͑17͒ are macroscopic; all the microscopic variables have been integrated out.
IV. THE SADDLE-POINT EQUATIONS
We can now evaluate Eq. ͑17͒ by saddle-point integration, in the limit N→ϱ. We define G tt Ј ϭϪiK tt Ј . Taking derivatives with respect to the generating fields and using the normalization Z͓0͔ ϭ1 then gives ͑at the physical saddle point͒ the usual identifications
and also
Putting i (t)ϭ0 ͑they are no longer needed͒ and i (t) ϭ(t) then simplifies Eq. ͑20͒ to
in which now s(t)ϭ͓q(t),z t ͉T͔, and where W(T) denotes the distribution of local noise strengths:
͑25͒
Extremization of the extensive exponent N͓⌿ϩ⌽ϩ⍀͔ of Eq. ͑17͒ with respect to ͕C,Ĉ ,K,K ,L,L ͖ gives the saddlepoint equations
The effective single-trader averages ͗ . . . ͘ Ã , generated by taking derivatives of Eq. ͑20͒, are defined as
͑29͒
Upon elimination of the trio ͕Ĉ ,K ,L ͖ via Eq. ͑27͒ we obtain exact closed equations for the disorder-averaged correlation and response functions in the N→ϱ limit, Eq. ͑26͒, with the effective single-trader measure ͑29͒. One recovers the theory of ͓15͔ upon putting W
(T)ϭ␦(T).
Since the introduction of decision noise into the dynamics has only affected the term ⍀ ͑24͒, compared to the analysis in ͓15͔, the simplifications of the term ⌽ ͑reflecting the statistical properties of the trading strategies͒ derived in ͓15͔ apply unaltered, so that at the physical saddle point we again find
where A T denotes the transpose of the matrix A, and the entries of the matrix D are given by D tt Ј ϭ1ϩC tt Ј . We now find our effective single-trader measure M ͓͕q,s͖͔ of Eq. ͑29͒ reducing further to
͑33͒
For a given value of T, this describes a stochastic singleagent process of the form
Causality ensures that (1ϩG) tt Ј Ϫ1 ϭ0 for tЈϾt. The variable z t represents the original single-trader decision noise, with ͗z t ͘ϭ0 and ͗z t z t Ј ͘ϭ␦ tt Ј , and (t) is a disorder-generated Gaussian noise with zero mean and with temporal correlations given by ͗(t)(tЈ)͘ϭ⌺ tt Ј :
The correlation and response functions ͑21͒ and ͑22͒ are the dynamic order parameters of the problem, and must be solved self-consistently from the closed equations
which, following Eq. ͑28͒, also now involve averaging over the distribution of the noise strengths T. Note that M ͓͕q,s͖͔ as given by Eq. ͑33͒ is normalized, i.e., ͐DqM ͓͕q,s͖͔ϭ1, so the associated averages reduce to
͑38͒
The calculation in ͓15͔ of the disorder-averaged average bid and the volatility matrix ͑including the single-time volatility t 2 ϭ⌶ tt ) still hold, and hence
V. THE FIRST TIME STEPS
For the first few time steps one can calculate quite easily the order parameters ͑correlation and response functions͒ and the volatility, from Eq. ͑33͒, using the simplifications that follow from causality, such as
At tϭ0 this immediately allows us to conclude that ⌺ 00 ϭD 00 ϭ2. We now obtain from Eq. ͑33͒ the joint statistics at times tϭ1, given a value for T:
Equation ͑41͒ allows us to calculate C 10 and G 10 , although the presence of the decision noise induces expressions which are significantly more difficult to work out explicitly than those of the noise-free case in ͓15͔, and which will depend on the choice made for ͓q,z͉T͔:
We can now move to the next time step, again using Eq. ͑40͒, where we need the noise covariances ⌺ 11 and ⌺ 10 :
⌺ 10 ϭ1ϩC 10 Ϫ2G 10 , ͑44͒ ⌺ 11 ϭ2Ϫ2G 10 ͓1ϩC 01 ͔ϩ2͓G 10 ͔ 2 . ͑45͒
This procedure can, in principle, be repeated for an arbitrary number of time steps.
We now specialize to the case where the game is initialized in a tabula rasa manner, i.e., p"q(0)…ϭ␦͓q 0 ͔, and where we have no perturbation fields, i.e., (t)ϭ0. Now, also upon using the symmetry of P(z), we can reduce the above results to
ϫ͕͓q,z͉T͔Ϫ͓Ϫq,Ϫz͉T͔͖, ͑46͒ whereas for multiplicative noise ͑5͒ one has
In both cases the negativity of C 10 shows that the tabularasa initialized system immediately enters an oscillation, with the q i (1) on average having opposite sign to the corresponding q i (0). Initially, additive noise is found not to play a role, and the effective disorder-generated noise components (t) decorrelate, compared with the deterministic case of ͓15͔. Multiplicative noise, on the other hand, is seen to retain an impact, even for short times and large ␣, and to cause a reduction of the oscillation amplitude. Now we turn to small ␣, where we make the choice P(z)ϭ(2) Ϫ1/2 e Ϫz 2 /2 in order to work out integrals explicitly. For additive noise ͑4͒ we find
͓provided the above integrals over T exist; if they do not, we revert back to the leading orders of the Tϭ0 case ͓15͔, i.e., C 10 ϭO(ͱ␣) and G 10 ϭO(1/ͱ␣)͔. Combination with the expressions ͑44͒ and ͑45͒ shows that in leading order ͑1͒ϭ ͩ 1 2
in which w is a zero-average Gaussian variable, independent of (0), with variance ͗w 2 ͘ϭ3/2. Hence we find from the effective single spin equation ͑34͒
We observe, as in ͓15͔, that for small ␣ and additive decision noise, the first two time steps are driven predominantly by the disorder-generated noise component in Eq. ͑34͒. However, whether this noise component starts oscillating in sign is, in the case of decision noise, crucially dependent on the distribution of temperatures; only when ͐dTW(T) T Ϫ1 is sufficiently large should we expect the system to enter the high-volatility state. For multiplicative noise, on the other hand, we arrive for small ␣ at the leading orders
Here the oscillation is much stronger ͑provided we do not scale the temperatures with ␣). Combination with the expressions ͑44͒ and ͑45͒ shows that in leading order the disorder-generated noise not only drives the oscillation, but is also being amplified by a factor of the order of ␣ Ϫ1/2 : ͑1͒ϭϪG 10 ͑0͒ϩO͑␣ 0 ͒. ͑59͒
The effective single-trader equation subsequently gives
͑61͒
Thus, for small ␣ and tabula rasa initialization 2 additive decision noise has the most drastic effect on the dynamics, changing the leading order of the relevant observables by a factor of ͱ␣ ͑in contrast to multiplicative noise͒.
VI. STATIONARY STATE FOR ␣Ì␣ C †W"T… ‡
If the game has reached a time-translation invariant stationary state without long-term memory, then G tt Ј ϭG(t ϪtЈ), C tt Ј ϭC(tϪtЈ), and ⌺ tt Ј ϭ⌺(tϪtЈ). In this section we assume that the stationary state is one without anomalous response, i.e., lim →ϱ ͚ tр G(t)ϭk exists. The lower limit of such behavior in ␣ defines ␣ c "W(T)….
In a stationary state one generally finds agents who change strategy frequently, but also agents who consistently use the same strategy. For the latter frozen agents, the values of q i will grow linearly in time. We follow ͓15͔ and separate the two groups by introducing q i (t)ϭq i (t)/t; frozen agents will be those for whom lim t→ϱ q i (t) 0, and the quantity ϭlim ⑀→0 lim t→ϱ ͓͉͗q (t)͉Ϫ⑀͔͘ Ã gives the fraction of frozen agents in the original N-agent system, for N→ϱ. Transformation of the process ͑34͒ gives, for a given T
͑62͒
We now define q T ϭlim t→ϱ q T (t) ͑assuming this limit exists͒ and take the limit t→ϱ in Eq. ͑62͒, giving
with the time averages m T ϭlim →ϱ Ϫ1 ͚ tр ͓q t ,z t ͉T͔ and ϭlim →ϱ Ϫ1 ͚ tр (t). 
Averaging over the two times t and tЈ now gives, in a stationary state without anomalous response, the following:
͑67͒
Inserting the variance ͗ 2 ͘, as given in Eq. ͑64͒, then gives the general relation
A. Additive decision noise
In the case of additive decision noise ͑4͒ we have ͓q,z͉T͔ϭsgn͓qϩzT͔. The effective agent is frozen if q 0, in which case m T ϭsgn͓q T ͔. This solves Eq. ͑63͒, if and only if ͉͉Ͼͱ␣/(1ϩk). If ͉͉Ͻͱ␣/(1ϩk), on the other hand, the agent is not frozen; now q T ϭ0 and m T ϭ(1 ϩk)/ͱ␣. As a result, we can calculate cϭ͗m T 2 ͘ Ã and the fraction ϭ͓͉͉͗Ϫͱ␣/(1ϩk)͔͘ϭ1Ϫerf͓ͱ␣/2(1ϩc)͔ of frozen agents exactly as in in the case ͓15͔ without decision noise, giving the deterministic ͓i.e.
, W(T)ϭ␦(T)͔ result
cϭ1Ϫ ͩ 1Ϫ 1ϩc ␣ ͪ erf ͫ ͱ ␣ 2͑1ϩc ͒ ͬ Ϫ2ͱ 1ϩc 2␣ e Ϫ␣/2(1ϩc) .
͑69͒
We use Eq. ͑68͒ and calculate the covariance ͗m T ͘ Ã exactly as in ͓15͔. The final result is
with the value of c to be determined by solving Eq. ͑69͒. We find exactly the same transition point ␣ c Ϸ0.337 40, signaling the divergence of the integrated response k, as was found in the noise-free case, in accord with earlier numerical observations ͓20,12-14͔ and theoretical predictions ͓18͔. Numerical simulations of the ͑batch͒ dynamics of the present model ͑which we will not present here, for brevity͒ confirm quite convincingly that, upon measuring objects such as c or , in the case of additive decision noise, one indeed exactly recovers the graphs of ͓15͔, without any dependence on the noise parameters. This, however, will turn out to be quite different in the case of multiplicative noise.
B. Homogeneous multiplicative decision noise
Next we turn to the case of multiplicative noise ͑5͒, at first with the simplest distribution W (T) 
Working out the Gaussian integrals describing the statics of , with variance as given by ͑64͒, subsequently gives
From this equation the value of c is solved numerically. The fraction of frozen agents is given by
We calculate the remaining object ͗m͘ Ã in Eq. ͑68͒ by again distinguishing between frozen and nonfrozen agents and by using the two identities mϭ(T)sgn͓͔ ͑for frozen agents͒ and mϭ(1ϩk)/ͱ␣ ͑for fickle ones͒, both of which follow from Eq. ͑63͒, giving
Insertion into Eq. ͑68͒, together with Eq. ͑64͒, then gives the desired expression for the integrated response:
with the value of c to be determined by solving Eq. ͑74͒. Equivalently, using Eq. ͑74͒ we find, as in the Tϭ0 case ͓15͔
The integrated response k is positive and finite, and our solution exact, for ␣Ͼ␣ c "W(T)…. At ␣ c "W(T)… one finds that k diverges; this transition is, as for Tϭ0, found to happen when the fraction of fickle agents equals ␣ ͓10͔. Finally, according to Eqs. ͑73͒ and ͑75͒ we can write ␣ c "W(T)… as ␣ c "W(T)…ϭerf͓x͔, where x is the solution of the transcendental equation
Equivalently, we can write our transition line explicitly in terms of the inverse error function as
where (T )͓0,1͔, see Eq. ͑6͒. In Figs. 1 and 2 we show the solution of Eq. ͑73͒ and the corresponding fraction of frozen agents as functions of ␣, together with the values for c and as obtained by carrying out numerical simulations of the batch minority game ͑8͒ with homogeneous multiplicative decision noise. The two figures for c and both show excellent agreement between theory and experiment above ␣ c (W(T)). One observes that, in addition to a reduction in the persistent correlation, another effect of the introduction of multiplicative decision noise is an overall increase in the fraction of frozen agents. This is consistent with our solution of the first few iteration steps, where introducing decision noise had the effect of dampening the oscillations. In Fig. 3 we show the system's phase diagrams for W(T)ϭ␦(TϪT ), defined by the transition line, where kϭϱ. This line is given by the solution of Eq. ͑78͒ in the case of multiplicative noise, and by ␣ c "W(T)…Ϸ0.337 40 ͓i.e., the value corresponding to (0) ϭ1͔ for additive noise. Below ␣ c "W(T)… our simulations show, as has been observed and reported earlier for the deterministic case, that in the anomalous response region the stationary state reached by the system depends critically on the initial conditions. For small values of the ͉q i (0)͉ ͑i.e., weak initial strategy preferences͒ the system enters a highvolatility state with low c and , whereas for large values of the ͉q i (0)͉ ͑i.e., strong initial strategy preferences͒ the system enters a low-volatility state with large c and .
C. Inhomogeneous multiplicative decision noise
Finally we turn to the more complicated situation of multiplicative noise ͑5͒ with arbitrary distributions. For a frozen agent and for a given value of T one has m T ϭ͑T ͒sgn͓q ͔. ͑79͒
As before, this solves Eq. ͑63͒ if ͉͉Ͼͱ␣(T)/(1ϩk), whereas for ͉͉Ͻͱ␣(T)/(1ϩk) the agent is fickle, i.e., q T ϭ0 and m T ϭ(1ϩk)/ͱ␣. According to Eqs. ͑36͒ and ͑37͒, the calculation of persistent order parameters will now also involve averaging over the noise distribution. Since the macroscopic dynamics turns out to depend on T only via (T), it will be advantageous to define w() 
͑80͒
Here ͓0,1͔, with ϭ0 reflecting T→ϱ contributions and ϭ1 reflecting T→0 ones. Now we may write
͑81͒
We calculate the remaining object ͗m T ͘ Ã in Eq. ͑68͒ by again distinguishing between frozen and nonfrozen agents and by using the two identities m T ϭ(T)sgn͓͔ ͑for frozen agents͒ and m T ϭ(1ϩk)/ͱ␣ ͑for the nonfrozen ones͒, both of which follow from Eq. ͑63͒, giving
with the value of c to be determined by solving Eq. ͑81͒. Using Eq. ͑82͒ this can again be written in the familiar form ͑77͒, which suggests that the kϭϱ transition is of a geometrical nature. Unless we revert back to uniform noise levels, a transformation like ␣ c "W(T)…ϭerf͓x͔ will now no longer be helpful; to find the location of the phase transition one has to solve Eq. ͑81͒, together with the condition kϭϱ. Upon putting y 2 ϭ␣/2(1ϩc) one can, however, compactify these two coupled equations to We will finally work out our equations describing the system with inhomogeneous multiplicative decision noise explicitly for the following simple bimodal distribution
with ⑀͓0,1͔. For ⑀ϭ1 we revert back to the homogeneous case studied earlier in this section; for ⑀ϭ0 we return to the model of ͓15͔. Here we have
with the function (T) as defined in Eq. ͑6͒. The general Eqs. ͑81͒ and ͑82͒ from which to solve c and , reduce to
͑89͒
Similarly, the two coupled Eqs. ͑84͒ and ͑85͒ which define the phase transition, reduce to
Note that for T→0 our transition line equations reduce once more to those of the noise-free case, as derived in ͓15͔, giving ␣ c Ϸ0.33 740. For T→ϱ, in contrast, we find a strong dependence on ⑀ ͑the fraction of traders who experience decision noise͒. In particular, there is a qualitative difference between ⑀Ͻ1 and ⑀ϭ1 ͑where one of the two noise levels in the system becomes zero͒. For ⑀ϭ1 we return to the case of uniform decision noise, and Eqs. ͑90͒ and ͑91͒ dictate that the transition line obeys ␣→0 as T→ϱ. For ⑀Ͻ1 ͑i.e., a nonzero fraction of the traders take decisions deterministically͒ on the other hand, we find for T→ϱ the Eqs. ͑90͒ and ͑91͒ ͑which will now have a solution with finite y) reducing to
.
͑94͒
The solution of this equation defines the point ␣ c (⑀,Tϭϱ), which obeys ␣ c (⑀Ͻ1,Tϭϱ)Ͼ0 and ␣ c (1,Tϭϱ)ϭ0. In Figs. 4 and 5 we show the ͑numerical͒ solution of Eq. ͑89͒ for the persistent correlation c, and the corresponding value for the fraction of frozen agents, as given by Eq. ͑90͒, as functions of ␣ and for different choices of the parameters ͕T,⑀͖, together with the corresponding values for c and , as obtained by carrying out numerical simulations. Here we have chosen Gaussian distributed z j (l), i.e., (T) ϭerf͓1/Tͱ2͔. As before, one observes excellent agreement between theory and experiment above ␣ c , and a strong dependence on initial conditions below ␣ c . Finally, in Fig. 6 we show, in the (␣,T ) plane, the system's phase diagram as defined by the kϭϱ transition line, obtained by solving numerically the coupled Eqs. ͑90͒ and ͑91͒, for different values of ⑀.
VII. STATIONARY VOLATILITY FOR ␣Ì␣ c "W"T……
As in the noise-free case ͓15͔, one finds that the volatility matrix ͑12͒, which is to be calculated from expressions ͑35͒ and which in a stationary state is time-translation-invariant ⌶ tt Ј ϭ⌶(tϪtЈ), generally involves both long-term and short-term fluctuations. Hence even the ordinary single-time stationary volatility 2 ϭ⌶(0) cannot be expressed in terms of the persistent order parameter c ͑or its relatives k and ). Upon separating in the functions C and G the persistent from the nonpersistent terms, i.e., C(t)ϭcϩC (t) and G(t) ϭG (t) ͑there is no persistent response for ␣Ͼ␣ c ) we find, as in ͓15͔:
͑95͒
Obtaining an exact expression for 2 would require solving our coupled saddle-point Eqs. ͑36͒ and ͑37͒ for C tt Ј and G tt Ј for large times but finite temporal separations tϪtЈ, hence in practice one has to resort to approximations. The approximation chosen in ͓10,11͔, for instance, is in our language equivalent to substituting
Here we will generalize to the case of decision noise ͑at least for the batch MG͒ the slightly more accurate approximation proposed in ͓15͔. We will abbreviate the double averages
In order to find the volatility we separate the correlations at stationarity in a frozen and a fickle contribution:
which gives, using C (tϪtЈ)ϭC(tϪtЈ)Ϫc, and upon rewriting the fickle contribution to the volatility 2 ϭ 1
The approximation of ͓15͔ consists of retaining in the contribution from fickle agents only the instantaneous uϭt terms, the rationale being that the u t ones represent, in the original single-trader equation, a retarded self-interaction, which is assumed to be significant only for frozen agents.
Hence we obtain , from right to left͒. For each value of ⑀, the solid line separates a nonergodic phase with anomalous response ͑left͒ from an ergodic one without anomalous response ͑right͒. For additive noise our theory predicts the T-independent transition given by the vertical line ͑i.e., the ⑀ϭ0 curve͒.
We note that only for W(T)ϭ␦(T) ͓15͔, i.e., w()ϭ␦( Ϫ1), where ϭ1, will Eq. ͑103͒ involve only persistent observables. In the presence of decision noise, as in this study, one always has Ͻ1, and additional approximations are required to also reduce the last term in Eq. ͑103͒ further to an expression in terms of persistent order parameters only. This is done in detail in Appendix A, where we show that a reasonable approximation is obtained by simply putting
The end result is the following final approximation for the stationary-state volatility:
with as given by Eq. ͑103͒. Expression ͑104͒, which reverts back to that of ͓15͔ for T→0 and which also reduces correctly to the random trading limit ϭ1 for T→ϱ ͑where ϭ1, cϭkϭϭ0), turns out to be a surprisingly accurate approximation of the volatility for ␣Ͼ␣ c ͑i.e., in its regime of validity͒. This can be observed in Figs. 7 and 8, where we compare the approximate prediction ͑104͒ to the volatility as observed in numerical simulations, for both homogeneous multiplicative noise defined by W(T)ϭ␦(TϪT ) and for inhomogeneous multiplicative noise defined by Eqs. ͑86͒ and ͑87͒, respectively. In all cases (T)ϭerf͓1/Tͱ2͔. ͑Note the persistent order parameters have already been calculated in the previous section.͒ We note that expression ͑104͒ is very similar to that obtained by different means for the on-line case in ͓10,11͔, from which it can be obtained by the replacement c→.
The above results emphasize once more the qualitative difference between additive and multiplicative noise; in contrast to additive noise, the system remains sensitive to multiplicative noise even for ␣Ͼ␣ c . The resulting dependence of the volatility on the multiplicative noise strength is very similar to that reported in ͓6͔ for additive noise ͑which was later understood to be caused by insufficient equilibration ͓13,14͔͒.
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this paper we have generalized the thermal minority game ͓6͔ to the case of imhomogeneous agent populations ͑where the decision noise, which can be either additive or multiplicative, is of nonuniform strength͒. We have solved the dynamics of the batch version of this model by generalizing the recent application ͓15͔ to the minority game of the generating functional techniques of ͓16͔ ͑note that in ͓15͔ only the fully deterministic case was studied͒. This formalism reduces the N-agent dynamics, in the limit N→ϱ, to a stochastic process for a single ''effective agent,'' with dynamic equations involving colored noise and a retarded selfinteraction. It leads to exact closed ͑but implicit and nontrivial͒ equations for correlation and response functions.
Our theory enables us to ͑i͒ obtain a better understanding of previously observed but only partially explained phenomena ͑e.g., the suppression of the volatility by decision noise ͓6,12͔, even below random for ␣Ͻ␣ c , due to damping of the ''crowd anti-crowd'' oscillations ͓7-9͔, or the increase in the volatility in the presence of multiplicative decision noise for ␣Ͼ␣ c ͒, ͑ii͒ derive exact phase diagrams, and ͑iii͒ calculate macroscopic observables ͑e.g., the fraction of frozen agents and the persistent correlations͒ in ergodic stationary states exactly. 3 In the case of additive decision noise we find a phase diagram identical to that of deterministic decision making in the onset of equilibrium properties of the higher ␣ ergodic phase, with nonergodic behavior at lower ␣. In the case of multiplicative decision noise, in contrast, we arrive at phase diagrams with nontrivial decision noise dependencies of the phase separation line as well as the behavior of both phases. Here the control parameters are the relative number of possible values for the external information, ␣ϭp/N, and the parameters characterizing the noise statistics. In the nonergodic regime of the model ͑i.e., for sufficiently small ␣) our closed equations in terms of correlation and response functions are still exact, and can be solved in principle iteratively for arbitrary times; however, finding the stationary states is hard ͑see e.g., the calculations for the simpler case ͓15͔͒.
4 Here we have restricted our calculations in the nonergodic regime to the the first few time steps, finding noise dependence for both additive and multiplicative decision noise.
In the present paper we have only worked out explicitly two types of choices for the decision noise strengths statistics: a delta distribution ͑i.e., decision noise of uniform strength͒, and a parametrized class of bimodel distributions.
3 Although the stationary-state equations, derived upon assuming ergodicity and absence of long-term memory, are no longer valid in the nonergodic regime, Figs. 1, 2, 4, and 5 show that for ␣ Ͻ␣ c "W(T)… their predictions regarding the persistent observables c and , nevertheless, give good qualitative agreement with the results of simulations from a highly biased start ͑for the volatility , which also involves nonpersistent order parameters, this is no longer the case͒. 4 Note that a recently proposed procedure ͓22͔ for calculating at least the high-volatility stationary state in the nonergodic regime, based on assuming the integrated response function ͑which diverges exactly at the critical point͒ to remain infinite throughout the ␣ Ͻ␣ c region, is not likely to work for the case of decision noise. It would, for instance, predict the simple relation ϭ1Ϫ␣ ͑i.e., being independent of the noise parameters͒, which is clearly in conflict with the simulation experiments presented in this paper. Due to the general nature of our solution, however, there is no limit to the different types of noise statistics we could have studied. This emphasizes once more the remarkable potential and appropriateness to the minority games of the generating functional analysis methods of ͓16͔. Two natural next steps would be ͑1͒ to develop the generating functional formalism for the original ''on-line'' formulation of the game, where the external information is fed to the agents sequentially, 5 or ͑2͒ to analyze our present ͑exact͒ orderparameter equations further in the nonergodic region ␣ Ͻ␣ c "W(T)….
APPENDIX: APPROXIMATION OF NONPERSISTENT TERMS IN THE STATIONARY VOLATILITY
The term Qϭ͓(1ϩG ) Ϫ1 (1ϩG T ) Ϫ1 ͔(0) in Eq. ͑102͒, which contains contributions of nonpersistent order parameters, can be written as
